Smith v. R. - TCC: Jazz flight attendant - airport parking pass was a taxable benefit

Smith v. R. - TCC:  Jazz flight attendant - airport parking pass was a taxable benefit

http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/230262/index.do

Smith v. The Queen (April 21, 2017 – 2017 TCC 62, Ouimet J.).

Précis:  The taxpayer was a flight attendant with Jazz.  CRA included in his income for 2011 $504 in respect of a benefit from a parking pass at Calgary airport.  Mr. Smith appealed to the Tax Court which dismissed his appeal, finding that the parking pass was a benefit from employment.  There was no order as to costs as this was an informal procedure appeal.

Decision:  This is the latest in a long line of cases dealing with what constitutes a benefit from employment, particularly the use of parking facilities.  On those authorities it is not particularly surprising that the Court found the provision of parking facilities at an airport for use by a flight attendant was a taxable benefit:

[1]             This is an appeal by Mark Smith (“Mr. Smith”) in respect of his 2011 taxation year. The Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) reassessed Mr. Smith to include in his income an amount of $504 pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act (the “ITA”). The amount of $504 was included in Mr. Smith’s income as a taxable benefit received in the course of employment and it represents the value of a parking pass at the Calgary airport that was provided to Mr. Smith by Jazz Aviation LP (“Jazz”).

[47]        On the evidence, I have come to the conclusion that, on the balance of probabilities, the primary beneficiary of the parking pass at the Calgary airport was Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith received an economic benefit that was measurable in monetary terms. The value of the benefit is the value of the parking pass for the 2011 taxation year, that is, $504.

[48]        I cannot conclude that Jazz paid for the parking pass for any business purpose. The obligation to pay for the parking pass is found in the Collective Agreement, but no explanation was provided to me as to why it was included in the Collective Agreement. The only conclusion I can reach is that Jazz paid for the parking pass simply because it was required to do so pursuant to the Collective Agreement. As for a potential increase in the reliability and flexibility of flight attendants, including Mr. Smith, by virtue of their commuting by car to their place of work, the evidence did not show that there actually was such an increase. In the end, the evidence did not show that Jazz received any benefit at all from Mr. Smith’s use of the parking pass.

Thus the appeal was dismissed.  There was no order as to costs since this was an informal procedure appeal.